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Do people “play fair,” or do they exploit their bargaining power? This paper 
suggests that such questions may not be well posed. It studies two bargaining 
situations that are very similar from the point of view of current fairness/focal 
theories of behavior, but differ in their strategic aspects. Different behavior in the 
two cases and a tendency by subjects after the experiment to describe as “fair” 
what actually occurred are reported. Journal of Economic Literature Classifica- 
tion Numbers: 026, 215. o 1991 Academic press, IIIC. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Human behavior, even in simple bargaining situations, is not well un- 
derstood. Numerous rival theories compete for attention, but the data are 
seldom adequate to justify a rejection of one in favor of another. It is often 
not even clear what the significant control variables are. 
This paper examines only one small aspect of the problem. It describes 
an experimental attempt to compare the predictions of two qualitatively 
distinct types of theory. First, there are the fairness/focal theories of 
bargaining behavior as propounded by Giith (1990), Kahneman et al. 
(1986), Roth (1985), Selten (1978), and others. Second, there are the stra- 
tegic theories of bargaining behavior, notably that of Rubinstein (1982). 
Game-theoretic or strategic models treat the bargainers as rational optimi- 
* We are grateful to the Economics and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom 
for generously funding this research project. We also thank P. Knox and S. Chew for 
efficiently programming the experiments, and A. Hoolighan, A. Klin, C. Mirrlees. C. 
Purkhardt, and B. Thakker for their invaluable help in supervising the experiment and 
recruiting the subjects. We are also grateful to the Psychology Department at the London 
School of Economics for the use of their laboratory. 
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zers and hence predict that the players will exploit whatever bargaining 
power they possess. Fairness/focal theories view the agreement on which 
subjects settle as being determined by social norms or conventional un- 
derstandings that render the agreement focal, given the circumstances in 
which the bargainers are working. In a bargaining context, the social 
normals often involve “fairness” considerations, but other features of the 
situation may also be important. For example, deals involving whole 
numbers of dollars may be salient in some circumstances. 
It is not easy to distinguish fairness/focal behavior from strategic be- 
havior. Indeed, part of the message of this paper is that what people 
perceive as “fair” or focal can sometimes be explained in terms of the 
strategic realities of the situation. However, we found it possible to design 
two simple laboratory games that, superficially at least, seem very similar 
from a fairness/focal viewpoint but which differ significantly in their stra- 
tegic characteristics. 
To summarize the results of the experiments very briefly, the subjects’ 
behavior was biased in the direction of strategically optimal play. Under 
one of the two conditions, the differences in behavior between the two 
types of game were very marked indeed. The same turned out to be true 
of what the subjects asserted to be fair when questioned on this issue 
ufrev playing the game.’ That is to say, what they judged to be fair after 
experiencing actual play was biased in the direction of the outcome that 
would result from strategically optimal behavior in the game they had 
actually played. 
Peter Cramton (1988) has run the same experiment using our computer 
programs with Yale undergraduates as his subjects. His conclusions will 
be reported elsewhere. We note only that they are broadly consistent with 
ours. However, his subject population was half the size of ours. 
Commentary on the results is left to a concluding section. At this point, 
we observe only that the fairness/focal and strategic bargaining literatures 
by no means exhaust all possible viewpoints. See, for example, Leventhal 
(1980), Thibaut (1968), or Walster et al. (1973). 
’ Individuals in the same pool from which the subjects were drawn but who did not play 
the game were also surveyed on the “fairness” question. There was no significant difference 
on what was reported as “fair” in the two types of game. This fact could be used for 
rhetorical purposes in support of the conclusions of the paper, but we do not feel the very 
dispersed data are good enough for this purpose. In asking inexperienced people for an 
opinion about a complicated matter, one must expect noisy answers: and it may well be that 
the data from the poll contain essentially nothing but noise with little or no relevance to the 
experiment. The best that one would seem entitled to conclude is that the description of the 
two types of game offered to the subjects for an opinion did not trigger any firmly held 
preconceptions about what is or is not fair in bargaining situations. 
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2. BARGAINING MODELS 
The basic problem for the subjects in all the models considered is that of 
dividing a sum of money2 that we call a “cake.” If the negotiations break 
down, player I will receive a payment which is equivalent to a share cr of 
the cake and player II will receive a share /? of the cake, where (Y + p I 1. 
What is fair in such a situation? Three possible answers to this question 
merit special attention: 
(a) Split-the-difference (S-T-D). With this outcome, player I is as- 
signed (Y, player II is assigned p, and then they split the remainder of the 
cake equally. This outcome is the Nash bargaining solution with the sta- 
tus quo located at (a, /3). Player I’s final share is then (1 + (Y - p)/2 and 
player II’s share is (1 + /3 - a)/2. 
(b) Fifty-fifty (50 : 50). With this outcome, the breakdown payments (Y 
and p are ignored and each player simply gets half the cake. 
(c) Deal-me-out (D-M-O). With this outcome, the breakdown pay- 
ments are ignored and the result is 50 : 50, unless this would assign player i 
less than i’s breakdown payoff of y. If so, player i gets y and the other 
player gets the remaining 1 - y of the cake. 
The term deal-me-out derives from a previous paper (Binmore et al., 
1989~) and is intended to suggest player i’s response to the proposed 
implementation of 50: 50 when y > 4. Its possible role as a “fairness” 
criterion was suggested by critics of the previous paper. 
In all the games considered, a was taken to be very small (a = 0.04). 
Two values of p were considered: a high value (fi = 0.64) and a low value 
(/3 = 0.36). Figure 1 provides a convenient means of comparing the three 
different notions for different values of p (but with (Y fixed at 0.04). 
To discuss strategically optimal play, it is necessary to be specific 
about the bargaining procedure to be used. We employ a procedure stud- 
ied by Rubinstein (1982). Accessible accounts of variants of his model, 
including those considered here, are to be found, for example, in Binmore 
et al. (1989b) or Sutton (1986). 
In the Rubinstein procedure, the players alternate in making proposals 
indefinitely until a proposal is accepted or the negotiations break down. 
Some incentive is necessary to encourage the players to reach an early 
agreement. The two classes of games considered differ in how this incen- 
tive is provided and in how breakdowns may occur. 
z We proceed throughout on the questionable assumption that utility can be identified with 
money. 
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FIG. I. The “fairness” criteria. 
(A) Games with optional breakdown. In these games, a player may 
opt out after refusing a proposal3 made by the opponent (and only then). If 
a player opts out, the negotiations are deemed to have broken down, and 
the players receive their breakdown shares, cx and p, of the current cake. 
The incentive for an early agreement is provided by the fact that the cake 
and the outside options shrink by a factor of 6 immediately before each 
proposal after the first. 
The game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which player I 
offers a share equal to max{p, 6/( 1 + 6)) to player II at time 0, and player 
II accepts (Binmore et al., 1989~). Note that the equilibrium outcome 
converges to D-M-O as 6 + 1 -. 
(B) Games with forced breukdown. In these games, players may not 
choose to opt out and the cake does not shrink. Instead, after each re- 
fusal, a random move decides whether the negotiations will be broken off 
or allowed to continue. The probability of a continuation is taken to be the 
same value of 6 as in optional breakdown games. The incentive for early 
agreement is therefore that the cake may disappear altogether if the nego- 
tiations are prolonged, leaving each player with only their breakdown 
payment. 
1 It matters when a player may opt out (Shaked. 1987). 
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TABLE I 
p = 0.36 p = 0.64 
Optional breakdown 
Forced breakdown 
Regime 0 Regime I 
Low optional High optional 
Regime 2 Regime 3 
Low forced High forced 
The game has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium in which player I 
offers a share equal to {@I - (Y) + p}l(l + 6) to player II at time 0, and 
player II accepts (Binmore et al. 1989~). Note that the equilibrium out- 
come converges to S-T-D at 6 -+ 1 -. 
Each of these two classes of games was run under two conditions: low 
/3 and high p. This yields four different games that are referred to as 
regimes 0, 1, 2, and 3 as indicated in Table I. Thus the labels 0 and 1 refer 
to optional breakdown games with low and high p, respectively, and the 
labels 2 and 3 refer to forced breakdown games with low and high /3, 
respectively. 
Two points should be noted. The first is that a subgame-perfect analysis 
predicts future behavior even if past behavior has not been as predicted. 
Our earlier work (Binmore et al., 1989~) on optional breakdown games 
indicates that one should not expect instant agreement at time zero from 
subjects in the laboratory, but that there is reason to believe that the 
game-theoretic prediction of the final outcome, in terms of the cake then 
available, may not fare too badly. Results are therefore always reported in 
terms of player II’s share of the cake available at the time the game 
ended. When 6 + 1-, the game-theoretic prediction will always be D-M- 
O in optional breakdown games, and S-T-D in forced breakdown games. 
The second point is the more important. For a given value of p, optional 
breakdown games and forced breakdown games are intended to present a 
similar payoff profile to the subject, who may therefore be inclined to 
treat them in the same way in deciding what is or is not fair or focal. 
Indeed, since a subgame-perfect analysis of an optional breakdown game 
is identical to that of a forced breakdown game when (Y = p = 0, one 
might expect even a strategically minded but inexperienced subject to fail 
to recognize the rather subtle distinction between the two classes of 
game. If subjects behave differently in optional breakdown games from 
the way they behave in forced breakdown games, one would therefore 
seem to have evidence in favor of the players’ bargaining power being a 
significant factor in determining the final outcome. It is this consideration 
that provides the major motivation for the experimental design described 
in this section. 
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3. THE EXPERIMENT 
Subjects were recruited directly from undergraduate classes in eco- 
nomics at the London School of Economics. The students had not studied 
game theory or bargaining, nor were these topics part of the curriculum 
for the courses they were attending. The recruiters were graduate stu- 
dents in Psychology who also supervised the fully automated experimen- 
tal runs in the Psychology Laboratory. Subjects were informed that the 
experiment was “in economics” rather than “in psychology,” but were 
not informed of the identities of the authors of this paper. As to the details 
of the game itself, our intention was that the subjects be perfectly in- 
formed about the rules of the game and the monetary payoffs to be distrib- 
uted. 
The main experiment ran for 6 days. Each day had four sessions, with 
each session devoted to a different regime from Table 1. Each session 
involved four subjects, who each played 10 games in all. After each game, 
a subject’s opponent was changed. On arrival, subjects were seated in 
isolated booths with a minimum of interaction between them. They com- 
municated via networked microcomputers. They were first asked to read 
written instructions (Appendix A), and then to operate a demonstration 
program that provided them with hands-on experience on how to make 
and respond to offers and so on. The cake was represented on the screen 
by a rectangular slab. The subject made an offer by moving a “knife” up 
or down the cake until satisfied with the division it indicated. The mone- 
tary amounts being proposed were also displayed. The demonstration 
program did not involve any examples of partitions of the cake since we 
were anxious not to interfere with the natural focal point structure of the 
game. 
After running the demonstration program and asking any questions 
they might have,4 the subjects then played six “practice games” for 
which no payments were made. They then played four “real games” in 
each of which the cake was initially worth 0.00. At the time of the 
experiment (December 1987), this was worth about $8.00. We felt this 
sum provided an adequate incentive for the subject to devote some care 
and attention to the experiment, given that we were asking for only 30-45 
min of their time. Since each group of four subjects in a particular session 
played a total of 20 games altogether (12 for practice and 8 for real) and 
since each regime was in force on each of 6 days, we observed a total of 
120 games for each of the four regimes (72 for practice and 48 for real). 
To minimize on reputation effects, the subjects’ bargaining partners 
were changed after each game. Their role in the game also varied. Half the 
4 A supervisor could be summoned by pressing an appropriate key. 
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time they occupied the role of player I (who moves first and has a break- 
down payment of (Y) and half the time they occupied the role of player II 
(who moves second and has a breakdown payoff of fl). We attach impor- 
tance to this alternation of roles in game-theoretic experiments. A rational 
player bases his strategic analysis of a game on the way he would play if 
he were in the shoes of the opponent. Alternating roles provides subjects 
with an opportunity to see things from the other player’s viewpoint and 
hence to understand the game better. In a previous experiment (Binmore 
et al., 1985, 1988), such role switching influenced the outcome very mark- 
edly. 
At the end of each session, subjects were asked to remain seated until 
they had completed a questionnaire (Appendix B) and had been paid the 
total amount of money they had successfully bargained for in the four real 
games that each had played. They were then invited to leave one by one 
with a view to minimizing interaction. 
Under all the four regimes of Table 1, the cake was worth f5.00 in the 
main experiment and the parameter 6 was taken to be 0.9. In all four 
regimes, player I’s breakdown share of CY = 0.04 was therefore initially 
worth f0.20 in money. 
For optional breakdown games (regimes 0 and l), the cake shrinks over 
time according to the discount factor 6, and it is left to the players’ 
discretion whether to force a breakdown by opting out. Under regime 0, 
player II’s breakdown share of p = 0.36 was initially worth El .80. Under 
regime 1, player II’s breakdown share of /3 = 0.64 was initially worth 
f3.20. 
For forced breakdown games (regimes 2 and 3), the cake does not 
shrink, but there is a risk of an imposed breakdown every time that an 
offer is refused. Our intention was that the players should believe that the 
game continues after a refusal with probability 6 = 0.9, but here we met 
with a difficulty in our pilot experiments. The manner in which we sought 
to resolve this difficulty requires some explanation. 
In our initial pilot, the written instructions described the probabilistic 
mechanism by means of which breakdown occurred and, after each re- 
fusal, subjects saw a simulated roulette wheel turn on their screens. Nev- 
ertheless, they tended to behave as though the possibility of a breakdown 
ever occurring was negligible.5 That is to say, they neglected to note that, 
although 0.9 is nearly 1, (0.9)” is small when n is sufficiently large. Such 
misconceptions about probabilistic matters are, of course, commonplace 
as laboratory phenomena. 
After various attempts, we sought to evade the difficulty by telling the 
5 And, in many cases, confirmed this interpretation of their behavior by their comments on 
the questionnaire. 
302 BINMORE ET AL. 
subjects, in their written instructions, that the maximum length for each 
game had already been chosen in advance, but that they were not to be 
told what this length was. However, they were invited to proceed on the 
assumption that, after each refusal, the probability of the game continuing 
was 0.9. The precise wording was as follows: 
In each of the ten sessions, the number of proposals allowed before a break- 
down is announced has been fixed in advance. But we are going to keep you 
guessing by not telling you what these ten numbers are. All you will know for 
sure is that a breakdown will occur eventually if agreement is delayed long 
enough. The maximum number of proposals allowed in each session may be 
large or it may be small, and knowing what the number turns out to be in one 
session will not help much in guessing what it will be in another. The numbers 
have been fixed so that, however many proposals there may already have been 
in a session, you should still reckon that there is a 90% chance of being allowed 
at least one more proposal. This means for example. that it is more likely that 
12 or more proposals will be allowed than 3 or less. 
No subject expressed any confusion about the issue on their question- 
naire. We chose the maximum lengths for 10 games that each subject 
played to be: 
9, 2, 11, 2, 10, 7, 7, 16, 12, 8. 
The two short games were intended to convince the subjects that break- 
down could indeed occur. Otherwise, our intention was that the data 
available to the subjects should not be such as to allow them rationally to 
reject the hypothesis that breakdowns occur independently with probabil- 
ity 0.1, even if they participated in games that always ended in break- 
down.h 
4. RESULTS 
The raw results are available as an appendix to a discussion paper 
Binmore et al. (1989a). We will be pleased to supply a copy of this discus- 
sion paper on request. In this section, the results we believe to be relevant 
are summarized in six histograms (Fig. 2-4). We always report percent- 
ages of the cake obtained by player II. (In optional breakdown games, the 
cake shrinks over time. The percentage of the cake is then computed in 
terms of the cake available at the time the game ended.) Games that do 
not end in agreement are indicated by an empty box. Player II then gets 
h We do not, of course, believe that the subjects did carry out any elaborate probabilistic 
calculations. It is enough for our purposes if the subjects are convinced that the game will 
end eventually but that it is unlikely to do so immediately. 
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his or her breakdown share /? (36% under regimes 0 and 2; 64% under 
regimes 1 and 3). 
The immediate issue is whether, in view of the similarity of their payoff 
profiles and the subtlety of their strategic differences, optional breakdown 
and forced breakdown games generate the same behavior, although a 
subgame-perfect analysis predicts D-M-O in the former and S-T-D in the 
latter. Before considering this question, some preliminary comments are 
useful: 
How Big is Epsilon? 
Game theory treats players as rational optimizers, who are assumed to 
squeeze the last penny from a situation on the assumption that their 
opponent will do the same. But in practice, one must accept that subjects 
will treat small enough amounts as negligible. As a rule-of-thumb, we 
proceed as though anything less than the price of a cup of coffee (f0.2 = 
4% of 0.00 at the time of the experiment) is negligible. In particular, we 
neglect the fact that the strategically optimal outcomes with the actual 
discount factor used (6 = 0.9) differ slightly7 from those in the limiting 
case when 6 + l-. 
Round Number Focal Points 
A further source of possible distortion is the tendency of subjects to 
settle on deals in round numbers. Under the high /? regimes 1 and 3, this 
tendency makes S-T-D attractive (since 80% of the cake is f4.00 at time 0) 
and creates a possible focal point at 70% (which corresponds to f3.50 at 
time 0). Under the low /3 regimes 0 and 2, a round number focal point may 
exist at 60% (which corresponds to f3.00 at time 0). 
Disagreements 
It is sometimes argued that the fact that subjects often fail to agree 
immediately in bargaining games of perfect information is a serious obsta- 
cle to a game-theoretic interpretation of their behavior. It is true that, in 
the models of this paper, all equilibrium offers will be accepted in equilib- 
rium and hence any refusal is an out-of-equilibrium phenomenon. How- 
ever, although he accepts in equilibrium, the responder in these models is 
always indifferent between accepting and refusing. Thus a refusal by a 
responder does not necessarily represent a large deviation from the game- 
’ For example, under regime 0, a subgame-perfect analysis predicts 47.42% for player II 
when player I makes the first offer, and 52.67% when player II makes the first offer. These 
are both approximated by the 50% predicted by D-M-O. 
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theoretic prediction if deviations are measured in terms of the responder’s 
anticipated payoffs.8 
This discussion is particularly relevant to disagreements in the “high 
optional” games of regime 1. A subgame-perfect equilibrium analysis of 
such games predicts that player I will offer player II approximately p = 
64% at time 0, and that this will be accepted. But such an offer is approxi- 
mately equal to player II’s outside option in such games. If he refuses the 
offer made to him and instead takes his outside option, it is true that he 
deviates from what the analysis predicts, but the deviation is negligible in 
terms of the payoff he receives. For this reason we count disagreements 
under the high optional regime 1 as being supportive of the game-theoretic 
prediction (namely D-M-O) rather than dismiss them as “noise.” 
We do not do the same for “forced breakdown” games. The bargaining 
in the games of this type that the subjects played for money was c&ater- 
ally terminated by the computer after a minimum of seven offers had been 
rejected. Disagreements in forced breakdown games therefore convey 
little information relevant to this study, beyond the fact that disagree- 
ments do indeed occur even though they are not predicted.’ The same 
goes for the “low optional” games of regime 0. 
The Data 
A statistical analysis appears in Section 7. Figure 2 summarizes the data 
for the high p regimes 1 and 3. The difference of behavior between op- 
tional breakdown and forced breakdown games is very marked. At this 
point we note only that game theory predicts the observed behavior much 
better than the fairness/focal alternatives listed in Section 2 that take no 
account of strategic issues. It is not surprising that 50 : 50 does not do well 
when player II can get 64% without the consent of his partner,‘O but it is 
instructive that S-T-D predicts very much better than D-M-O in forced 
breakdown games, while D-M-O predicts better than S-T-D in optional 
breakdown games. 
The results for the low /3 regimes 0 and 2 are summarized in Fig. 3. Here 
the differences between optional breakdown and forced breakdown are 
8 Moreover, a prediction based on a subgame-perfect equilibrium analysis presupposes 
that it is common knowledge that the players are “perfectly rational.” If subjects entertain 
doubts on this score, one might also see deviations from equilibrium by proposers who are 
“testing the rationality” of their opponent. One might then also observe deviations by 
responders who anticipate such behavior from their opponent in the future. This latter point 
is relevant to what follows in the text on opting out. 
y Note in particular that breakdown in the “high forced” regime 3 is nor compatible with 
D-M-O when the latter is regarded as a “fairness” criterion because, although player II gets 
p, player I only gets a instead of his “fair” share of 1 - /3. 
‘” Although a number of researchers have observed systematic violations of individual 
rationality in related contexts. 
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FIG. 2. A comparison of the paid “high optional” games with the paid “high forced” 
games for the f5 cake. An open square (0) refers to the games that ended in a breakdown, 
and a solid square (m) to those that did not. The solid circles (0) on the horizontal axis at 50, 
60, 70, and 80% indicate possible round number focal points. These percentages of f5 are 
f2.50, f3.00, f3.50, and f4.00, respectively. 
slight. The round number focal point at 60% (f3.00 at time 0) is perhaps 
responsible for producing this result, since it lies roughly midway be- 
tween D-M-O (50%) and S-T-D (66%). 
To examine this possibility, we ran the low p regimes 0 and 2 again, but 
with the ~0.00 cake replaced by an $11.00 cake. Subjects were told that 
their dollar winnings would be paid to them in pounds sterling at the then 
current exchange rate. Otherwise the circumstances of the experiment 
were identical. The point of doing this was to create two round number 
focal points (at $6.00 and $7.00) between the D-M-O prediction of 50% 
and the S-T-D prediction of 66%. Figure 4 shows the sharper data ob- 
tained. The differences between optional breakdown and forced break- 
down games are statistically significant (Section 7). Game theory cannot 
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FIG. 3. A comparison of the paid “low optional” games with the paid “low forced” 
games for the f5 cake. An open square (II) refers to the games that ended in a breakdown, 
and a solid square (m) to those that did not. The solid circles (0) on the horizontal axis at 50, 
60, 70, and 80% indicate possible round number focal points. These percentages of f5 are 
f2.50, f3.00, f3.50, and f4.00, respectively. 
be said to predict these data well, but it does better than the fairness/focal 
alternatives being considered. 
5. QUESTIONNAIRE 
Interesting results were obtained from the subjects’ answers to the 
questionnaire (Appendix B). We discuss only ” the answers to Questions 
I1 It is not clear to us how much weight can be given to the answers to Question 8. For the 
record, we observe that 50% of the subjects were unambiguously of the view that it is 
socially acceptable to use one’s bargaining power, and 17% were unambiguously of the 
opinion that one ought to “play fair.” 
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FIG. 4. A comparison of the paid “low optional” games with the paid “high optional” 
games for the $11 cake. An open square (0) refers to the games that ended in a breakdown, 
and a solid square (D) to those that did not. The solid circles (0) on the horizontal axis at 45, 
55, 64% indicate possible round number focal points. These percentages of $11 are $5.00, 
$6.00, and $7.00, respectively. 
5, 6, and 7. In these questions, the subjects were asked to indicate what 
they felt to be a fair way to split the cake in three situations. In each 
situation, player I’s breakdown share of the cake was (Y = 0.04 but player 
II’s was successively p = 0.04, /I = 0.36, and /3 = 0.64. The unanimous 
response to Question 5 ((-u = /3 = 0.04) was that 50: 50 is fair in this 
symmetric situation. 
The answers to Question 6 (/3 = 0.36) and Question 7 (p = 0.64) are 
summarized in Figs. 5 and 6. Figure 5 shows the views about fairness 
expressed by all those who had experienced optional breakdown games 
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FIG. 5. The share of the cake for player I1 proposed as “fair” for low and high /3 situations 
by subjects who had experienced optional breakdown games. 
(in which D-M-O is strategically optimal). The x-coordinate of a point’* in 
the figure shows what was asserted to be fair in a low breakdown payoff 
situation (p = 36%) and the y-coordinate shows what was asserted to be 
fair in a high breakdown payoff situation (p = 64%). Figure 6 similarly 
shows the views of all those who had experienced forced breakdown 
games (in which S-T-D is strategically optimal). 
The difference between Figs. 5 and 6 is striking. (See Section 7 for a 
statistical analysis.) Note in particular the following features: 
1. In both figures, a small group (around 10%) insists that 50 : 50 is 
“fair” in spite of the asymmetries they are invited to contemplate. 
2. Those who had experienced forced breakdown games (S-T-D stra- 
tegically optimal) were very much more in agreement about what is fair 
I2 Too much significance should not be attached to the precise location of points in Fig. 5 
and 6. For example, in Fig. 6, most subjects simply proposed the S-T-D point. These choices 
have been indicated by clustering them as close to the S-T-D point as possible without 
overlaps. Also, subjects were not always very neat in marking their choice of a “fair 
division” on their questionnaires. 
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FIG. 6. The share of the cake for player II proposed as “fair” for low and high p situations 
by subjects who had experienced forced breakdown games. 
than those who had experienced optional breakdown games (D-M-O) stra- 
tegically optimal). Results for optional breakdown games were very much 
more dispersed. 
3. In forced breakdown games, S-T-D predicts what was asserted to 
be fair quite well, and D-M-O predicts very badly. 
4. In optional breakdown games, the situation is more confused. 
However, D-M-O is no longer irrelevant to the data. 
We do not feel that these results are conclusive, but they do suggest that 
people’s views about what is fair may be heavily influenced by their 
strategic experiences in situations about which they do not have estab- 
lished preconceptions. 
6. UNLEARNING 
We were disappointed not to have sharper results under the optional 
breakdown regimes 0 and 1, since we had obtained sharp results in a 
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Regime 0: Low-Optional 
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FIG. 7. The first four practice games with optional breakdown for both low and high p in 
the case of the f5 cake. A open square (0) refers to the games that ended in a breakdown, 
and a solid square (m) to those that did not. The solid circles (0) on the horizontal axis at 50, 
60, 70, and 80% indicate possible round number focal points. These percentages of f5 are 
f2.50, f3.00, f3.50. and f4.00, respectively. 
previous studyi of optional breakdown games (Binmore rt al., 1989c), 
without apparent interference from round number focal points. However, 
in this previous study, subjects did not play repeatedly and hence had 
little opportunity to learn. It is therefore of interest to compare the results 
of our previous study with those shown in Fig. 7 for the first four practice 
games under the optional breakdown regimes 0 and I in the case of the 
f5.00 cake.14 
IS The size of the cake and the values of LY and p were roof the hame. 
I4 We did not run regime 1 with an $11 cake. The results from practice games under regime 
0 for the $ I 1 cake are very similar to those for the f5 case. Only the first four practice games 
are reported so that the number of observations in each of the histograms of Fig. 2. 3.4. and 
7 is the same. 
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The results from these practice games and those from our previous 
study are similar, in that D-M-O predicts the data quite well in absolute 
terms, and overwhelmingly better than S-T-D. The drift away from this 
distribution is evident from Fig. 3. One can tell a story for the high p 
regime 1 about subjects learning that player II needs an epsilon on top of 
what is available from opting out if he or she is to be kept at the negotiat- 
ing table. However, this would not seem to explain why player II’s pay- 
offs should improve over time under the low p regime 0. Presumably 
round number focal points are somehow relevant. Evidence in support of 
this would seem to be provided by the differing results obtained for the 
low /3 regime 0 with an $11 cake (Fig. 4). More research will perhaps 
provide an explanation for what is going on here. For the moment, the 
only safe conclusion would seem to be that, if people are indeed “natural 
gamesmen,“i5 then experience in this context would appear to lead to 
some “unlearning” of their game-playing skills. 
7. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
Here we present the results of nonparametric tests of the null hypothe- 
sis that the data sets presented in Fig. 2, 3, 4, and 7 are generated, pair by 
pair, by the same stochastic process. A variety of tests suitable for testing 
this hypothesis exists. The most commonly used in this context seem to 
be the Kolomogorov-Smirnov (KS), Cramer-von Mises (CM), and An- 
derson-Darling (AD) tests. Each compares empirical cumulative density 
functions (cdf s). A recent new test of Epps and Singleton (ES) (1986) 
compares empirical moment-generating functions. 
The above tests are “nonparametric” in the sense that their signifi- 
cance levels are not affected by the actual stochastic process generating 
the observed data. However, the powers of the tests do depend upon the 
specifics of the two stochastic processes generating the data. Little is 
known about the finite sample size ranking of these tests by their powers 
for various types of stochastic processes. Consequently, we conducted a 
Monte Carlo study in an effort to deduce if one test or another might 
“dominate” the others by offering largest power in the context of our 
study. The results of this study are presented in Appendix C. The alterna- 
tive distributions examined were selected so as approximately to mimic 
the empirical cdf s observed. We concluded that none of the four tests 
dominated the others, although the CM and AD tests generally performed 
at least as well as the KS and ES tests. These findings contrast with the 
results of the Monte Carlo study of Forsythe et ul. (1988), who found that, 
as a pair, the AD and ES tests dominated the others. A number of reasons 
Is A view that has been wrongly attributed to us in the past. 
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explain the differing conclusions. In particular, different sample sizes 
were used (25 in Forsythe et al. (1988) and 40 here) and different alterna- 
tive hypotheses were examined. 
The tests’ results are presented in Table II. The “Value” columns 
report the observed values of the statistics. The “10%” and “5%” 
columns report if the tests retain the null hypothesis of no difference in 
distribution or reject it, at the 10% and 5% significance levels, respec- 
tively. The tests all reject the null hypothesis of no difference in the cases 
of Figs. 2 and 7, and all retain the null hypothesis for Fig. 3. The data for 
Fig. 4 lead to a strong rejection of the null hypothesis by the CM and AD 
tests, a rejection by the KS test at the 10% significance level, and a 
retention by the ES test (the prob-value of the ES test is 16 . 5%). 
The two histograms of Fig. 4 suggest that the differences in the two data 
sets are, first, a shift in central location and, second, a difference in the 
size of a mass point. The Monte Carlo cases 2, 3, and 4 described in 
Appendix C investigate the relative powers of the four tests in the pres- 
ence of shifts of central location and/or variance. Cases 8 and 9 were 
intended to reveal the tests’s relative powers when a substantial mass 
point was introduced. In all of these cases the ES test is dominated 
(sometimes sharply) at either significance level by the CM or AD test. For 
these reasons we attribute more weight to the strong rejections of the null 
hypothesis of no difference by the CM and AD tests than to the somewhat 
weaker retention of the null hypothesis by the ES test. 
We also tested the null hypothesis that the data presented in Fig. 5 and 
6 were generated by the same bivariate process. There is a dearth of two- 
dimensional nonparametric tests available for this task. Extensions of the 
KS and Wald-Wolfowitz tests from one dimension to two have been 
developed by Friedman and Rafsky (1979) but, as yet, are poorly tabu- 
lated. Accordingly, we adopted the following approach, which mimics 
techniques used by spatial statisticians. We categorized the data points 
into six regions by dividing the rectangle [30,100] x [30,100] vertically at 
57 . 5 and horizontally at 57 * 5 and 71 * 5. The regions are labeled 1 to 6 
from top left to bottom right. 57 . 5 is the horizontal coordinate halfway 
between the D-M-O (and 50 : 50) and S-T-D points. 71 . 5 is the vertical 
coordinate halfway between the D-M-O and S-T-D points. 57 is the verti- 
cal coordinate halfway between the D-M-O and 50 : 50 points. Any data 
points occurring on a boundary were assigned to the lower region. Doing 
so weakens the case for rejection of the null hypothesis. The respective 
numbers of data points in the regions are 10, 14, 20, 9, 12, and 1 for Fig. 5, 
a total of 66 data points, and 3, 48, 2, 6, 8, and 0 for Fig. 6, a total of 67 
data points. The null hypothesis under test is that the two data sets are 
generated by the same stochastic process. Accordingly, we estimate the 
probability of a data point being generated for a particular region by 
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for the region from the combined sample of 133 data points. The respec- 
tive probabilities so assigned to the six regions are 13 62 22 s 0 and .3, 13.3, 1.30, 1.33, 133, 
&. These probabilities imply that the marginal and conditional probabili- 
ties for a data point (xi, ~2) generated by the estimated stochastic process 
are: 
Pr(30 I xl I 57 . 5) = a, 
Pr(57 . 5 < xl 5 100) = & 
Pr(30 5 x2 5 57 1 30 5 XI 5 57 * 5) = %, 
Pr(30 5 x2 % 57 1 57 * 5 < xl 5 100) = A 
Pr(57 < x2 5 71 + 5 1 30 d xl 5 57 . 5) = %, 
Pr(57 < x2 I 71 * 5 1 57 . 5 < xl I 100) = %, 
Pr(71 < x2 I 100 ) 30 I xi 5 58) = #, 
Pr(71 . 5 < x2 I 100 1 57 . 5 < xl ‘- 100) = %. 
We used this bivariate stochastic process to generate two independent 
samples, the first of size 66 and the second of size 67. The “distance” 
between the two samples was then computed as the sum, over the six 
regions, of the absolute values of the differences in the relative frequen- 
cies. We generated 1500 pairs of samples and computed the empirical 
distribution of the resulting 1500 values of the distance statistic. The range 
of the statistic is [0, 21 but the observed empirical distribution was concen- 
trated almost entirely between 0 . 1 and 0 . 5; the largest observed value 
was 0 * 713. The value of the statistic for the data displayed in Fig. 5 and 6 
is 1 . 009. We conclude that the null hypothesis that the data presented in 
Fig. 5 and 6 were generated by the same process can be rejected with very 
high confidence. This conclusion would be unaffected by moderate 
changes to the positions of the boundaries of regions 1 to 6. 
8. CONCLUDINGREMARKS 
The results of this experiment are consistent with the view that if the 
preconceived rules-of-thumb with which players may originally approach 
a game are not too firmly established, then they can be displaced by more 
sophisticated rules that take better account of the strategic realities of the 
situation. Moreover, there is evidence that subjects are willing to justify 
their new behavior by asserting that it is fair. It is not argued that these 
conclusions support the view that fairness/focal theories are mistaken. 
Nor is it claimed that subjects are natural gamesmen. Our belief is that a 
more sophisticated type of theory than either of these alternatives is 
necessary. 
We do not believe that people are natural gamesmen, if the term “natu- 
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ral gamesman” is taken to mean an individual who is familiar with all the 
results of game theory, who is capable of lightning mental calculations of 
great complexity, and who takes for granted that other individuals se- 
lected at random from the population at large have the same characteris- 
tics as themselves. In so far as people behave like gamesmen, it is pre- 
sumably because they are capable, to some extent, of adapting their 
behavior to new situations. We do not believe that the manner in which 
people learn in game-like situations is optimal or even close to optimal. It 
is clearly often a hit-and-miss affair which operates below the level of 
consciousness to a considerable degree. Nevertheless, we believe that 
game theory can be useful in predicting the outcome of such learning 
processes. 
One may speculate that people are equipped with rules-of-thumb that 
they use to settle conflicts of interest that arise in real-life bargaining 
situations and elsewhere, and that these rules-of-thumb embody fairness 
criteria or depend in other ways on salient or focal features of the environ- 
ment in which they are used. We shall follow Dawkins (1976) in referring 
to such rules-of-thumb as memes. It seems unlikely that people think very 
hard about these memes when using them in the real-life situations to 
which they are adapted. One tends to question ingrained habits or cus- 
toms only when their use generates unsatisfactory results. 
What triggers a switch from one meme to another? We have no general 
theory to propose. Certainly, this experiment was not designed to answer 
such a question. Its design specifically excludes the rich variety of con- 
versational or contextual cues that presumably prompt the substitution 
of one meme for another under the conditions of everyday life. At best, 
the experiment only serves to demonstrate that such switches from one 
meme to another can occur, and that game theory can be relevant in 
predicting the nature of the switch. There are evolutionary reasons why 
this may be thought plausible. One may ask: given a meme which is 
established in a human population, how does it manage to survive? Why 
does it not get displaced by an alternative meme? The game theorist’s 
answer is that it survives because it is adapted to the environment in 
which it is commonly used. That is to say, it prescribes behavior that is in 
equilibrium.r6 People will not usually be conscious of this fact and may be 
quite truthful in reporting that they are unmotivated by strategic consider- 
ations. But it is not necessary for individuals to know why a particular 
meme survives in order for it to survive. 
If this view is correct, a least in some circumstances, then one should 
I6 It goes without saying that this is a gross simplification. One must take into account the 
complexity of the meme’s environment. The more complex the environment, the more 
difficult it will be for better adapted memes to surface, and the longer it will take for them to 
become established. One must also consider the cost to individuals of implementing compli- 
cated strategies. And so on. 
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expect to observe memes in operation that are triggered by hints or cues 
in the environment that match the strategic realities of the situation. We 
hope that the current paper will be seen as a confirmation of the viability 
of such a standpoint rather than as just a refutation of a naive version of 
the fairness/focal explanation of human behavior. Subjects were put in 
situations for which life did not seem to have equipped them in advance 
with a strongly established rule-of-thumb. Behavior then evolved which 
correlated with the strategic situation, and many subjects seemingly de- 
veloped attitudes toward fairness that allowed them to rationalize this 
behavior in terms that were familiar to them. 
This behavior of our subjects is clearly not supportive of those who 
might wish to argue that “fairness memes” are altogether irrelevant in 
describing the behavior of subjects in such laboratory experiments as 
ours. Moreover, we do not doubt that it is possible to construct experi- 
ments in which adaptation to the environment of the kind we observed 
does not occur, even with large incentives and long time spans for learn- 
ing. One might frame the experiment in such a way as to trigger a form of 
the fairness meme that is very firmly established for use in a particular 
real-world context but which bears only a surface resemblance to the 
problem faced in the laboratory. I7 Alternatively, it would not be hard to 
interfere with the learning process by confusing the issues facing the 
subjects. Indeed, we seem to have done so inadvertently under regimes 0 
and 2 with the f5 cake by introducing a round number focal point at f3.00. 
Such experiments, confirming that fairness is relevant to the way people 
resolve bargaining problems, would not and do not refute the view that we 
are defending here. 
In summary, in defending the relevance of game theory to actual bar- 
gaining behavior, we are not denying that fairness/focal theories are also 
relevant. We deny only that a theory of this type that ignores strategic 
considerations is likely to get to what lies at the heart of human bargaining 
behavior. Most of all, we want to emphasize the importance of learning 
and adaptation in this context. 
APPENDIX A: THEINSTRUCTIONS 
Different written instructions were offered to subjects depending on the 
regime of the game they were to play, and whether they would be player I 
or player II in their first bargaining session. The instructions below are for 
a subject about to begin as player I under regime 1. The instructions for a 
I7 Invoking the meme in such pathological circumstances is, of course, precisely what one 
would wish to do if one’s aim were to study the mechanics of a particular established meme. 
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subject about to begin as player I under regime 3 were identical with the 
exception of the fourth paragraph. This was replaced, under regime 3, by 
the paragraph quoted in Section 3. Instructions for regimes 0 and 2 were 
the same except that the figure of f3.20 was replaced by X1.80. The 
necessary modifications for a subject about to begin as player II will be 
evident. 
Bargaining Experiment: Regime 1, Subject 0 
This is an experiment in which you will bargain via the computing equipment 
in front of you with the persons in the other booths. There will be ten separate 
and distinct bargaining sessions after each of which the person with whom you 
are paired may change. The initial six sessions are for practice. The remaining 
four sessions are “for real”. The other four persons were recruited in the same 
way as you and the order in which you and they will be paired has been chosen 
at random. 
In each of the ten sessions a “cake” which is always nomina//y worth f5 will 
be available for the two bargainers to share, provided they can come to an 
agreement on how it should be split. You and the other person will alternate in 
making proposals until either a proposal is accepted or the negotiations break 
down. You will make the first proposal in theJirsr session but in five of the ten 
sessions it will be the other person who makes the first proposal. 
Once a proposal is accepted, each of the two parties to the agreement will 
have his or her agreed share credited to their accounts. BUT, if the negotia- 
tions get broken off, the opportunity to split the cake will disappear. Instead. 
each player will receive a BREAKDOWN payment. In thejrsr session. your 
breakdown payment is 2Op and the other person’s is 23.20. But in five of the 
ten sessions, it will be your breakdown payment which is f3.20 and the other 
person’s which is 20~. 
Breakdowns can only occur immediately after a proposal has been refused. 
It is the person who just refused a proposal who decides whether or not to 
break off the negotiations. If the decision is to continue bargaining, the cake 
SHRINKS TO 90% OF ITS PREVIOUS SIZE and so, of course, do the break- 
down payments. 
The final four sessions are for “real” and we will pay you all the money you 
make in these sessions immediately after the last bargaining session in which 
you are involved. The preceding six sessions are for practice only. In these 
sessions you will have to pretend that you are bargaining over real money. 
In summary, you have to remember that each proposal which is made may 
be the last. But even if the negotiations get broken off, the session will not be a 
complete wash-out for you since you will still get your breakdown payment. 
This is not an experiment to find out what sort of person you ate. When we 
see the results, we shall neither know nor care who did what. We are only 
interested in what happens on average. So please do not feel that some particu- 
lar kind of behavior is expected of you. 
Before the first bargaining session, there will be a demonstration of the 
computing equipment. The demonstration program is started by pressing the 
SPACE BAR. But there is no need to hurry. You may have to wait for the 
other persons to be ready anyway. Read the instructions again if you think this 
may be helpful, or call the assistant if you need a question answered. 
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APPENDIX B: THE QUESTIONNAIRE 
It would help us if you would give brief answers to the following questions: 
1. Where were you recruited? 
2. Were the instructions and the demonstration program clear? 
3. Were there any hitches during the experiment? 
4. Why did you bargain the way you did? 
5. On the scale below, indicate what you feel would be a fair way to split the 
cake if person I’s and person 2’s breakdown payments were both f0.20. 
6. On the scale below, indicate what you feel would be a fair way to split the 
cake if person I’s breakdown payment were LO.20 and person 2’s break- 
down payment were fl.80. 
0.00 5.00 
7. On the scale below. indicate what you feel would be a fair way to split the 
cake if person I’s breakdown payment were f0.20 and person 2’s break- 
down payment were f3.20. 
8. Is this the sort of situation in which people ought to “play fair” or is it 
socially acceptable for them to make what use they can of whatever bargain- 
ing power they have’? 
9. Would you bargain in the same way if you were put in the same situation 
tomorrow? 
APPENDIXC: THE MONTECARLO STUDY 
The nonparametric test statistics used were the Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
(KS), Cramer-von Mises (CM), Anderson-Darling (AD), and Epps-Sin- 
gleton (ES) statistics. Let F,(x) and F*(x) denote two cumulative density 
functions (cdf s) defined on an observation space X E R. The null hypoth- 
esis is HO: F, = F2. The alternative, HA, is that Ho is false. Let FI and FZ 
denote the empirical cdf s generated by two independent random sam- 
ples, of sizes nl and nZ , respectively, from X. Let Pi2 denote the empirical 
cdf generated by the combined sample, of size nl + nz . The KS, CM, and 
AD test statistics compare the empirical cdfs pi, 1”;, and pi?. They are 
defined as follows: 
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and 
The ES statistic measures the distance between the empirical characteris- 
tic functions generated by the two samples. For an arbitrary but fixed 
integerJr llet{t,, . . . , tJ} be real and positive numbers. Let Xti denote 
observation i from sample j. The empirical characteristic function for 
sample j is 
( cos tkXu + i sin tlXij), 
fork=l,. . ., J and forj = 1, 2. 
Denote the 2 J x nj matrix of the real and imaginary parts of 4j by 
COS tJX,j COS tJXzj “’ 
sin tJX,j sin tJX,j ... 
forj = 1, 2. 
The average row sums of Gj are denoted by the 2 J x 1 vector 
&=$(g ’ 2 
n n 
cos tlxij, sin tlXii, . . . , 2 cos t,x,, 2 sin t,X, ) T, 
i-l i=l i=l 
forj = 1, 2. 
The Epps-Singleton statistic is 
ES = c * s (g1 - g2)T 6, + $2)~‘(8, - g2), 
where 3, and $2 are the variance-covariance matrices of GI and Gz, 
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asymptotically distributed as a x2 variable with 25 degrees of freedom. We 
chose sample sizes of nl = n2 = 40 for our study since the sizes of our data 
sets are close to these values. Following the recommendations given in 
Epps and Singleton (1986) for such sample sizes, we chose J = 5, (tl , 12, 
t, t4, rs) = (0 . 4, 0 . 8, 1 . 2, 1 . 6, 2 . 0) and c = 0 . 849. 
The alternative hypotheses used in our study are listed in Table III. The 
table also presents the estimated powers of each test, for significance 
levels of 10 and 5%. 10,000 independent pairs of samples of 40 data were 
generated for each case and the power estimates for the 10 and 5% signifi- 
cance levels were computed as the fraction of the 10,000 replications for 
which the null hypothesis that F, = Fz was rejected at these significance 
levels. 
The table suggests that no test dominates the others at the 10% level. 
The KS test never wins at the 5% significance level. The CM and AD tests 
generally do better than the KS and ES tests at either significance level for 
cases 2, 3, and 4, which present cases of shifts of central location and/or 
variance. The CM test does best at recognizing differences in distribution 
due to the existence of a substantial mass point. (The ES test is nonpara- 
metric even for discontinuous cdfs. However, the KS, CM, and AD tests 
assume continuous cdf s and so are not truly nonparametric for cases 6 to 
9.) The above results contrast with those obtained by Forsythe et al. who 
selected the AD and ES tests over the others on the basis of a study using 
samples of size 25. Our study’s results left us unable to discard any of the 
four tests. 
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